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Abstract
A state cigarette tax increase may deter some residents from smoking, but other
residents may avoid the higher tax by purchasing cigarettes from another state.
Using U.S. health survey microdata from 1999 to 2012, this paper measures how
border-crossing opportunities affect the smoking deterrence achieved by a cigarette
tax increase. I estimate by two-way fixed effects regression that a $1 state cigarette
tax increase decreases the smoking rate by an additional 0.58 percentage points for
each dollar of cigarette tax in the nearest lower-tax state. However, each successive
$1 tax increase decreases the smoking rate by 0.38 fewer percentage points than
the last. I show that the signs of these terms can be theoretically derived without
parametric assumptions. I observe that, as both home and nearest lower taxes rose
from 1999 to 2012, the mean effectiveness of a home state tax increase remained
roughly constant over the period. My results imply that the lowest-tax states are
those with the greatest power to reduce the national smoking rate.
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1 Introduction
From a public health perspective, smoking deterrence is vital. Anti-smoking policies saved an
estimated 157 million years of life from 1964 to 2012 (Holford et al., 2014). From an economic
perspective, smoking deterrence is socially beneficial because it limits negative externalities
such as secondhand smoke and litter. There may also be “internalities” (Herrnstein et al.,
1993; Gruber and Koszegi, 2001) associated with smoking, whereby consumers, especially
adolescents, are fundamentally unable to assess the full present and future costs of consuming
an unhealthy and addictive product. Cigarette taxes are a pervasive method of correcting for
these market failures as well as raising public revenue. Every state in the U.S. has collected
a cigarette tax since 1970, and there have been over 120 increases in state cigarette taxes in
the 21st century.
A common political argument against state cigarette tax increases is that consumers will
react by traveling to another state with a lower tax and buying cigarettes there. Many states
have outlawed such “casual smuggling” if it exceeds one or two cartons per trip. Larger-scale
organized smuggling also arises from interstate tax differences. The Contraband Cigarette
Trafficking Act of 1978 made smuggling more than 50 cartons (equivalent to 500 packs, or
10,000 cigarettes) a federal offense with a penalty of up to five years in prison.
The existence of both casual and organized smuggling implies that a consumer’s decision
to smoke may depend not only on the price of cigarettes in his home state, but the price
in another state and the cost of travel. Thus, depending on the attractiveness of border
crossing, a tax increase in one state may impact the effectiveness of a tax increase in another
state.1 Measuring these interacting effects of state cigarette taxes on smoking participation
is the main purpose of this paper.
I model the decision to smoke as depending on the tax in the home state, the distance
to the nearest state with a lower tax, and the value of the nearest lower tax. I use smoking
microdata from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) and take advantage
1In this paper, the “effectiveness” of a cigarette tax increase in either the home state or another state refers to the drop in
smoking participation it causes in the home state.
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of abundant variation across states in the timing and magnitude of cigarette tax increases
from 1999 to 2012. In line with my theoretical predictions, I find that the effectiveness of
a home state cigarette tax increase rises with the nearest lower tax, but that, keeping the
nearest lower tax constant, successive tax increases diminish in effectiveness. I estimate that
these two effects on the effectiveness of a home state tax increase cancel out when the nearest
lower tax rises at about two-thirds the rate of the home state tax, which is roughly what
occurred at the yearly means over the sample period. Lastly, I show my findings to be robust
to various alternative specifications and sample restrictions.
My findings imply that, because it would become a destination for smuggled cigarettes, a
state may not be able to acheive its smoking deterrence goals simply by raising its own tax to
some prohibitive threshold. On the other side, a state that is a source of smuggled cigarettes
exerts a positive externality on proximal states when it raises its cigarette tax. Thus, the
power to reduce smoking in the U.S. is especially in the hands of states with low cigarette
taxes. Therefore, even if it is certain that cigarette taxes will continue to rise, where they
rise will be an important determinant of how much the national smoking rate responds.
2 Literature
While policymakers are interested in cigarette taxation for the purposes of both smoking
deterrence and revenue generation, the literature has focused on the latter. A vast set of
theoretical and empirical works, rooted in Kanbur and Keen (1993), model the behavior of
revenue-maximizing governments that share a crossable border. Leal et al. (2010) provide a
survey of this literature.
Models of border crossing rely on the intuitive hypothesis that, all else equal, living closer
to a lower-tax jurisdiction increases the likelihood of cigarette smuggling. Testing this hy-
pothesis is complicated by the irregularity of state borders and population distributions.
Some authors simplify the problem by focusing on one tax increase in one state. For exam-
ple, Emery et al. (2002) investigate the extent of tax avoidance in California, while Hanson
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and Sullivan (2009) measure tax incidence in Wisconsin. Stehr (2005) measures cigarette
tax avoidance without explicitly considering border geography by comparing cigarette con-
sumption data from the BRFSS to state sales data and interpreting the difference as coming
from cross-border purchases.
Few individual-level surveys provide the geographical identification necessary to estimate
models of cross-border cigarette purchases. The Tobacco Use Supplements to the Current
Population Survey (TUS-CPS) is the most prominent such survey in the literature (Loven-
heim, 2008; Chiou and Muehlegger, 2008; and DeCicca et al., 2013a; 2013b). A key advantage
of the TUS-CPS is that it asks the respondent whether their most recent cigarette pack pur-
chase was in a state other than their state of residence. A key limitation is that the finest
identified level of geography for most observations in the TUS-CPS is the metropolitan sta-
tistical area (MSA), which is generally a group of one or more counties economically linked
with an urban core.
Nationwide data with greater detail than the TUS-CPS is rare, but available. Harding
et al. (2012) use Nielsen Homescan data from 2006 and 2007 to measure the effects of
proximity to lower-tax states on cigarette tax incidence. For consumers across the United
States, the Nielsen dataset provides their census tract of residence and the zip codes of the
stores at which they shop. This is a vast improvement in geographical identification over the
TUS-CPS. In their main specification, the authors interact the log of the distance from the
consumer’s home state to the closest lower-tax state with the difference in cigarette taxes
between them. In an alternative specification, they generalize the marginal effect of distance
by using interactions of distance range dummy variables and the tax difference. They find
that the consumer burden of a cigarette tax rises with distance to the border, especially for
households with annual income greater than $30,000.
While many authors use microdata to estimate price-participation elasticities for smok-
ing (Gallet and List, 2003), few account for cross-border purchases. The first to do so is
Lovenheim (2008), who uses the TUS-CPS waves from 1992 to 2002. Lovenheim estimates
statistically insignificant price-participation mean elasticities between -0.02 and -0.06, de-
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pending on the use of a year trend and accounting for the possibility of the nearest lower-tax
jurisdiction being an Indian reservation rather than another state.2 However, he finds that
doubling the distance to a lower-tax state reduces the price-participation elasticity by about
0.2. Thus, he provides evidence that those with a greater opportunity to buy cigarettes
across the border are less responsive to tax increases. Reinforcing that casual smuggling is
an extensive problem, he estimates that between 13% and 25% of smokers buy cigarettes
across a border.
To allow the dependent variable to be interpreted as either total consumption or the
smoking rate, the theoretical model in Lovenheim (2008) relies on parametric assumptions
for the cigarette demand function and the share of smokers that smuggle. In particular,
Lovenheim assumes that increasing the home tax and the nearest lower tax by the same
percentage has no effect on the smuggling share, which allows for estimation of the smuggling
share as a function of the distance to the nearest lower tax. In this paper, I show that, for
smoking participation in particular, the signs of the first- and second-order effects of the
home and nearest lower taxes can be derived without parametric assumptions.
Another paper that considers cross-border purchases, though not chiefly, is Callison and
Kaestner (2014) (hereafter C&K). Using the TUS-CPS waves from 1995 to 2007 with state
and survey wave fixed effects, they estimate that a one dollar increase in the cigarette tax
changes the probability that a person smokes by -0.7 percentage points. They estimate this
effect to be -1.0 percentage point but statistically insignificant when they restrict the sample
to only the 19 states with the largest tax increases over the period, and to be -0.3 percentage
points when they use a paired difference-in-difference approach on the restricted sample.
To account for border crossing, C&K interact the home state tax with three dummy
variables for intervals of distance to the nearest lower-tax state. They find that the home
state tax actually has a stronger negative impact on an individual’s probability of smoking
when his home MSA is within 120 miles of a lower tax state. C&K do not account for the
2Lovenheim obtains similar estimates with and without accounting for Indian reservations. I do not attempt to account for
Indian reservations in this paper. In an earlier working paper version (Lovenheim, 2007), he details the many difficulties he
had to overcome to do so. In short, states vary widely in their enforcement of tribal sales of cigarettes to non-members, and
tribal taxes and/or market power may undermine the assumption that tribes sell cigarettes at the non-tax price.
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magnitude of the nearest lower tax. This is problematic because MSAs with higher taxes
have a larger range of potential values for the corresponding nearest lower tax. This means
that for MSAs with higher taxes, the nearest lower tax will tend to be both larger and closer.
Therefore, distance and the nearest lower tax are likely to be negatively correlated. Indeed,
in the sample used in this paper, this correlation is -0.22. Thus, if the magnitude of the
nearest lower tax does impact the decision to smoke, estimates using only distance will be
biased.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper makes three novel contributions to the literature.
First, I show that the signs of the first-order and second-order effects of the home tax,
nearest lower tax, and distance to the nearest lower tax on smoking participation can be
theoretically derived without parametric assumptions. Second, and most importantly, I
empirically confirm the theory with the use of a larger, more recent, and more geographically
detailed dataset than that used in previous papers. Third, I document a curious observation:
due to the mean nearest lower tax rising at about two thirds the rate of the mean home tax
over the sample period, the effectiveness of an increase in the home tax at the means of
the variables has remained roughly constant over time. At the means in each sample year,
my estimates imply that a $1 increase in the home tax deterred 0.8% to 0.9% of the adult
population from smoking.
3 Data
I use smoking data from the BRFSS, an annual nationwide health survey. This is not the first
paper to use the BRFSS to measure the responsiveness of smoking participation to cigarette
taxes, examples being Sloan and Trogdon (2004) and DeCicca and McLeod (2008). However,
I am not aware of any that takes advantage of the county-level geographical identification
the BRFSS offers. The BRFSS asks respondents if they have smoked 100 cigarettes in their
lifetime, and if so, whether they currently smoke every day, some days, or not at all. I define
a smoker as a person who smokes every day.
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I pool all BRFSS surveys from 1999 to 2012 and exclude respondents that are pregnant
or at least 75 years of age.3 The period from 1999 to 2012 comprises every year following
the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (TMSA) for which counties are identified in the
BRFSS. The TMSA, adopted in November of 1998, fundamentally altered the U.S. tobacco
industry by requiring tobacco companies to cease a variety of marketing practices and to
make annual payments to fund state smoking-related medical costs and an anti-smoking
advocacy group. Therefore I find it appropriate to restrict the sample to the post-TMSA
era.
Information on federal and state cigarette taxes comes from The Tax Burden on Tobacco
(Orzechowski and Walker, 2014), which I organize into a monthly panel. Most cigarette tax
changes came into effect on the first of the month. For those that did not, I record the tax
change as coming into effect beginning with the following month. Cigarette taxes in the U.S.
are levied as a dollar amount per pack of cigarettes. I convert all taxes to January 2015
dollars using the monthly CPI.
The period from 1999 to 2012 contains a wealth of variation in cigarette taxes over states
and time. Every year in this period saw multiple states raise their cigarette taxes, and every
state except Missouri and North Dakota raised their tax at least once.4 The highest state
cigarette taxes are concentrated in the Northeast, while the lowest are concentrated in the
South. As of January 2015, the highest state cigarette tax in the U.S. was $4.35 per pack in
New York and the lowest was $0.17 in Missouri. The federal cigarette tax rose from $0.24
to $0.34 on January 1, 2000, to $0.39 on January 1, 2002, and to $1.01 on April 1, 2009.
I also take into account local cigarette taxes in the five counties that compose New York
City, in Cuyahoga County, OH, and in Cook County, IL.5 A few cities in Cook County have
their own cigarette taxes, including Chicago, which contains over half the population of Cook
3I choose the same age cutoff as C&K. Other papers such as DeCicca and McLeod (2008) restrict the sample to those
younger than 65. In Table A1 I show that the results are slightly stronger when those 65 and older are dropped from the
sample, consistent with the recent literature showing that older smokers are relatively unresponsive to cigarette tax increases
(Ma, 2015; MacLean et al., 2015).
4Cigarette taxes only decreased twice in the period, in each instance by 10 cents. The first was the expiration in 2004 of a
temporary 10 cent increase in Oregon. The second was in New Hampshire in 2011 and was repealed in 2013 as initally planned.
5County-level taxes introduce the possibility that the nearest lower tax may be in the same state. In my preferred specifica-
tion, I require the nearest lower tax to be in a different state. In Table A1 I show that the results are insensitive to allowing a
county in the same state to be the nearest lower-tax jurisdiction. This is reasonable especially because my treatment of NYC
is unaffected; the five NYC counties are all closer to a New Jersey county than any non-NYC county in New York.
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County. Because I am unable to identify the respondent beyond the county level, I use the
mean cigarette tax in Cook County weighted by population. The only other localities in the
sample with their own cigarette taxes are in Alabama, Missouri, and Virginia. Each of these
three states has many different cigarette taxes at the county and/or city levels, for which I
do not account. In the results section, I check that the estimates are robust to the exclusion
of these three states.
I measure distances between counties using 2010 centers of population from the U.S.
Census. I measure the distance from a county to a state as the distance from the county’s
center of population to the closest center of population of all counties in that state. I
exclude Alaska and Hawaii, leaving 48 states and the District of Columbia. For each month,
I exclude the state that has the lowest cigarette tax of all states, as the nearest lower tax
and the distance to it are undefined.6
Table 1 presents the means of the variables of interest for each survey year. After excluding
observations with missing values, the sample contains 3,366,814 observations.7 The sample
period is characterized by an upward trend in real cigarette taxes and a downward trend
in smoking. However, Table 1 leaves unclear the relative and interacting roles of home
and cross-border taxes in reducing smoking. The remainder of this paper theoretically and
empirically untangles the relationships between these variables.
4 Theoretical Model
The following model generalizes the framework of Saba et al. (1995), in which the repre-
sentative consumer chooses to either pay a higher price for cigarettes in his home state or
pay the cost of traveling to a state with a lower price. I allow for consumer heterogeneity
and focus on a third option: to not smoke at all. Essentially, the consumer compares his
reservation price for the first pack of cigarettes to the price in his home state and to some
6In Table A1, I alternatively include the lowest-tax state in each month by defining that state’s “nearest lower tax” to be
equal to its own tax and the log of distance to be 0. The estimates are practically identical.
7Missing values come primarily from non-identified counties, which are especially prominent in the earlier years of the
BRFSS. The percentage of the sample for which counties are not identified falls from about 25% in 1999 to 7% in 2012. As a
robustness check, I restrict the sample to only those counties that are identified in every year, and show that the results are
very similar.
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function of the price in the other state and the distance to that state.
The home state is denoted as state 1 and the consumer is a distance d2 from state 2. p1
and p2 are the prices of a pack of cigarettes in the respective states with p1 > p2. Let x(p; ~θ)
be the consumer’s demand function for cigarettes, where ~θ is a vector of preference param-
eters. Let p(x; ~θ) be the inverse demand function. Define p0 = p(0; ~θ), which represents the
consumer’s reservation price for the first pack of cigarettes. The consumer enjoys a surplus
of
∫ p0
p1
x(p; ~θ) dp from buying cigarettes in the home state. He prefers buying cigarettes in
the home state to buying no cigarettes at all if and only if the surplus is positive, which is
true if and only if p0 > p1.
The consumer enjoys a surplus of W (p2, p
0; ~θ) =
∫ p0
p2
x(p; ~θ) dp from buying cigarettes in
the other state, but to do so must pay a transport cost C(d2) that increases with distance.
He prefers buying cigarettes in the other state to buying no cigarettes at all if and only if the
surplus exceeds the transport cost. Therefore there exists a “critical distance” d∗(p2, p0; ~θ) =
C−1(W (p2, p0; ~θ)) such that the net surplus W − C is zero. Therefore the consumer prefers
buying cigarettes in the other state to buying no cigarettes at all if and only if d∗ > d2. There
also exists a “critical price” p∗(d2, p0; ~θ) = W−1(C(d2), p0; ~θ) such that the consumer prefers
buying cigarettes in the other state to buying no cigarettes at all if and only if p∗ > p2.
Consider ~θ to be a vector of random variables, so that p0 and p∗ are dependent random
variables with joint probability density function (pdf) f(p0, p∗; d2) for a given value of d2.
Assume f is continuously differentiable and note that f is non-negative. Let S equal one if
the agent smokes and zero otherwise. The probability that the agent smokes is the probability
that at least one of the two states offers him a net surplus from purchasing cigarettes there:
P (S = 1) = P (p0 > p1 ∪ p∗ > p2) = 1− P (p0 < p1 ∩ p∗ < p2)
= 1−
∫ p1
0
∫ p2
0
f(p0, p∗; d2) dp∗ dp0
(1)
Differentiating shows how the probability of smoking and the effectiveness of price in-
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creases change with the prices in the two states:
∂P (S = 1)
∂p1
= −
∫ p2
0
f(p1, p
∗; d2) dp∗ ≤ 0 (2)
∂P (S = 1)
∂p2
= −
∫ p1
0
f(p0, p2; d2) dp
0 ≤ 0 (3)
∂2P (S = 1)
∂p1∂p2
= −f(p1, p2; d2) ≤ 0 (4)
∂2P (S = 1)
∂p12
= −
∫ p2
0
∂f
∂p1
(p1, p
∗; d2) dp∗ (5)
∂2P (S = 1)
∂p22
= −
∫ p1
0
∂f
∂p2
(p0, p2; d2) dp
0 (6)
Equations 2 and 3 quantify the drop in the probability of smoking due to increases in
the home price and cross-border price, respectively. Equation 4 quantifies the effect of an
increase in one state’s price on the effectiveness of an increase in the other state’s price. The
cross-partial derivative in Equation 4 is non-positive, implying that, if anything, an increase
in the home state price is made more effective by a higher price in the other state. Intuitively,
this is because a higher price in the other state makes it less likely that the consumer will
switch to buying there in response to an increase in the home price, and thus makes it more
likely that he will quit smoking instead.
The signs of the pure partial derivatives in Equations 5 and 6 can be determined under
the conditions described by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose, for some finite m and possibly infinite n, that f(p) is a non-
negative continuously differentiable function such that ∂f
∂p
(p) 6= 0 ∀p ∈ (m,n) and limp→n f(p) =
0. Then ∂f
∂p
(p) < 0 ∀p ∈ (m,n).
Proof. Because limp→n f(p) = 0, there exists y ∈ (m,n) such that 0 ≤ f(y) ≤ f(m). By
the mean value theorem, there exists a ∈ (m, y) such that ∂f
∂p
(a) = f(y)−f(m)
y−m ≤ 0. Suppose
that ∂f
∂p
(b) ≥ 0 for some b ∈ (m,n). By the intermediate value theorem, there exists c in the
interval bounded by a and b such that ∂f
∂p
(c) = 0. But c ∈ (m,n), a contradiction. Therefore
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∂f
∂p
(p) < 0 for all p ∈ (m,n).
To sign Equation 5, note that f(p1, p
∗; d2) is a non-negative continuously differentiable
function of p1, and that, by nature of being a pdf, limp1→∞f(p1, p
∗; d2) = 0. Then, if
∂f
∂p1
(p1, p
∗; d2) is not zero for all p1 greater than some m, it must be negative for p1 > m.8
∂f
∂p1
(p1, p
∗; d2) being non-positive ∀p∗ ∈ (0, p2) and negative on some subinterval means that
both sides of Equation 5 are positive. Therefore, at a high enough home price, successive
increases in the home price will diminish in effectiveness.
To sign Equation 6, note that f(p0, p2; d2) is a non-negative continuously differentiable
function of p2, and that, because the consumer is never willing to pay as much for cigarettes
that require travel than ones that don’t, limp2→p0f(p
0, p2; d2) = 0. Then, if
∂f
∂p2
(p0, p2; d2)
is not zero over some interval bounded above by p0, it must be negative on that interval.
∂f
∂p2
(p0, p2; d2) being non-positive ∀p0 ∈ (0, p1) and negative on some subinterval means that
both sides of Equation 6 are positive. This means that, at a high enough price in the other
state, successive increases in that price will cause smaller and smaller drops in smoking in
the home state.
The above logic merits some discussion. Proposition 1 states the conditions for a point
of diminishing effectiveness, past which a function, such as a pdf, must decrease to zero.
Up to that point, the second derivative with respect to a tax cannot be determined. This
is because there may be disproportionately dense regions, or “spikes”, in the pdf around
certain reservation prices. Suppose, for illustration, that there happens to be a large share
of people that would quit smoking if and only if the home price exceeded $6.50. Raising the
price from $5 to $6 is not very effective, but raising the price from $6 to $7 is super effective.
Then, from $5 to $7, the second derivative of the probability of smoking with respect to
the tax is negative. Proposition 1 ensures that, unless f is pathological, spikes in f must
eventually be exhausted as the price increases. Therefore, at a high enough price, the second
derivative cannot be negative.
8What if there is no such m? Then either f has zero density for all p1 > m, or the derivative of f changes sign an infinite
number of times. In the first case the derivative is zero. For an example of the second case, consider f(p) =
2sin2(p)
pip2
.
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To derive the marginal effects of distance, recall that the probability of smoking can be
stated in terms of the critical distance rather than the critical price:
P (S = 1) = P (p0 > p1 ∪ d∗ > d2) = 1− P (p0 < p1 ∩ d∗ < d2)
= 1−
∫ p1
0
∫ d2
0
g(p0, d∗; p2) dd∗ dp0
(7)
where g(p0, d∗; p2), assumed to be continuously differentiable, is the pdf of p0 and d∗ for
a given value of p2. This makes it simple to show how the probability of smoking and the
effectiveness of price increases change with distance:
∂P (S = 1)
∂d2
= −
∫ p1
0
g(p0, d2; p2) dp
0 ≤ 0 (8)
∂2P (S = 1)
∂d2∂p1
= −g(p1, d2; p2) ≤ 0 (9)
∂2P (S = 1)
∂d2∂p2
= −
∫ p1
0
∂g
∂p2
(p0, d2; p2) dp
0 (10)
∂2P (S = 1)
∂d2
2 = −
∫ p1
0
∂g
∂d2
(p0, d2; p2) dp
0 (11)
Equation 8 quantifies the drop in the probability of smoking due to an increase in distance.
Equation 9 quantifies the effect of an increase in distance on the effectiveness of an increase
in the home price. The cross-partial derivative in Equation 9 is non-positive, implying that,
if anything, an increase in the home state price is made more effective by a greater distance
to the other state. Intuitively, this is because a greater distance to the other state makes it
less likely that the consumer will switch to buying there in response to an increase in the
home price, and thus makes it more likely that he will quit smoking instead.
To sign Equation 10, recall Proposition 1. Note that g(p0, d2; p2) is a non-negative contin-
uously differentiable function of p2, and that, because the consumer is never willing to travel
to pay the maximum price he is willing to pay at home, limp2→p0g(p
0, d2; p2) = 0. Then, as
long as ∂g(p
0,d2;p2)
∂p2
is not zero over some interval bounded above by p0, it must be negative
on that interval. ∂g
∂p2
(p0, d2; p2) being non-positive ∀p0 ∈ (0, p1) and negative on some subin-
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terval means that both sides of Equation 10 are positive. Therefore, for a high enough price
in the other state, an increase in that price has a smaller effect when it is farther away.
To sign Equation 11, note that g(p0, d2; p2) is a non-negative continuously differentiable
function of d2, and that, by nature of being a pdf, limd2→∞g(p
0, d2; p2) = 0. Then, as long
as ∂g
∂d2
(p0, d2; p2) is not zero for all d2 greater than some m, it must be negative for d2 > m.
∂g
∂d2
(p0, d2; p2) being non-positive ∀p0 ∈ (0, p1) and negative on some subinterval means that
both sides of Equation 11 are positive. Therefore, for a far enough distance, successive
increases in distance will have smaller and smaller effects on the probability of smoking.
To relate the entire discussion of prices to taxes, the only necessary assumption is that
prices and taxes are positively related. As long as pass-through rates are entirely positive, all
of the derivatives with respect to taxes have the same signs as the corresponding derivatives
with respect to prices, even if pass-through rates vary across states or time. Thus the theory
presented here guides an examination of the reduced form relationship between taxes and
smoking participation. From a public policy perspective, this is not a disadvantage, since
policymakers are generally unable to skip the intermediate causal steps between these two
variables.
5 Methods
5.1 Econometric Model
Following DeCicca and McLeod (2008), I estimate linear probability models with two-way
fixed effects. Initially, I regress an indicator for being a smoker on the cigarette tax in the
respondent’s county and a set of controls:
P (Sicst = 1) = β0Tct + ~α · ~Xi + ζust + δs + γt + icst (12)
Sicst is equal to one if and only if respondent i in county c of state s at survey month t
smokes every day and is otherwise equal to zero. Tct is the sum of federal, state, and county
cigarette taxes in county c at the start of month t in January 2001 dollars, centered at the
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sample mean. ~Xi is a set of individual characteristics comprised of dummy variables for
marital status, employment status, education, sex, race, one, two, or three or more children
in the household, and categories for income and age.9 ust is the unemployment rate in state
s and month t and δs and γt are state and month-year fixed effects, respectively. β0, the
estimated effect of raising the tax by a dollar on an individual’s probability of smoking, is
the coefficient of interest. I expect β0 to be negative by the law of demand. Alternatively, I
allow the marginal effect to vary with the value of the tax by adding the square of the tax
on the right hand side.
To take cross-border purchases into account, I include the cigarette tax in the nearest
state to the respondent’s county with a lower cigarette tax, which I denote T ′ct, the log of
the distance in miles to that state, which I denote dct, and all second-order terms involving
these two variables and the home state tax. I center the nearest lower tax and log of distance
at their sample means.10
P (Sicst = 1) = β0Tct + β1T
′
ct + β2dct + β3(Tct × T ′ct) + β4(Tct × dct)
+β5(T
′
ct × dct) + β6T 2ct + β7T ′2ct + β8d2ct + ~α · ~Xi + ζus + δs + γt + icst
(13)
By Equations 4 and 9, I expect β3, β4 < 0. By Equations 2, 3, and 8, I also expect that
the marginal effects of taxes and distance are also non-positive at all reasonable values of T ,
T ′, and d:
∂P (S = 1)
∂Tct
= β0 + β3 × T ′ct + β4 × dct + 2β6 × Tct ≤ 0 (14)
∂P (S = 1)
∂T ′ct
= β1 + β3 × Tct + β5 × dct + 2β7 × T ′ct ≤ 0 (15)
∂P (S = 1)
∂dct
= β2 + β4 × Tct + β5 × T ′ct + 2β8 × dct ≤ 0 (16)
While Proposition 1 predicts that β5, β6, β7 and β8 are positive for large enough values of
9I include respondents that refused to answer, and, in the case of income, didn’t know or were not sure (DK/NS). As shown
in Table A2, I assign dummy variables to refusal and DK/NS entries as if they were simply another possible response outcome.
In Table A1 I show that excluding all respondents with at least one refusal or DK/NS entry (about 13% of the sample) does
not affect the results.
10Because centering only subtracts a constant (the sample mean) from each variable, it has no impact on the estimated
marginal effects or their standard errors. However, it does allow the coefficients on the first-order terms to be interpreted as
the marginal effects at the means of the variables.
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T , T ′, and d, whether the values in the sample are “large enough” is unknown. A negative
estimate does not contradict the theory, and a positive estimate raises the possibility, but
does not prove, that the point of diminishing effectiveness has been reached.
5.2 Identification
The two-way fixed effects model is identified by variation in cigarette taxes across both
states and months. That is, the model relies on the fact that states raised their taxes by
different amounts and at different times. State fixed effects control for all time-invariant
state characteristics, which is important because states have inherent differences that affect
both smoking rates and tax policies.11 Differences in cultural attitudes toward smoking, for
example, may cause cigarette taxes and smoking rates to be negatively correlated indepen-
dent of the effect of taxes on quantity demanded. However, time-varying characteristics such
as economic conditions may also affect both smoking rates (Ruhm, 2005; Xu, 2013; Kenkel
et al., 2014) and state tax policies (Maag and Merriman, 2003). In particular, a economic
downturn at the state level may simultaneously reduce the demand for cigarettes and moti-
vate the state government to use a cigarette tax increase to combat budgetary concerns. I
control for the state unemployment rate in the survey month to address this issue. In Table
A1, I show that the results are largely robust to not controlling for the unemployment rate.
While DeCicca and McLeod (2008) maintain that state tax increases were motivated
by budget shortfalls that are uncorrelated with smoking rates, other plausible motivations
are similarly compatible with the identification strategy. Golden et al. (2014) consider a
vast suite of explanatory variables and find that cigarette tax increases are most strongly
associated with the political alignment of state governments. After the TMSA, Republican-
controlled governments were less likely to raise cigarette taxes than mixed-party or Democrat-
controlled governments. As the political alignment in a given state over time is unlikely to be
correlated with the smoking rate, this explanation also suggests that the model is appropriate.
11A natural issue with using fixed effects is multicollinearity with the variables of interest. To test the level of multicollinearity,
I regress each of the variables of interest on the other two in addition to state and month fixed effects. For the home tax, nearest
lower tax, and log of distance, this results in variance inflation factors of 8.5, 6.29, and 1.21, respectively. Values below 10 are
commonly considered acceptable.
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Ultimately, though, I cannot rule out the possibility that one or more omitted variables
are correlated with both state cigarette taxes and smoking rates. One step to dealing with
this problem is to include state-specific linear time trends. This amounts to adding δs×t, the
interaction between the state fixed effect and the month-year of the survey, to the right-hand
side of Equation 13. Without this interaction term, I assume that unobserved differences
across states are time-invariant, hence the state effects being “fixed.” By including linear
trends, I generalize the state effects to be a linear function of time.
6 Results
In the following tables of estimates, the estimated coefficients βˆ0 through βˆ8 are listed in
order. Estimated coefficients on the controls for the preferred specification are provided
in Table A2. I multiply all of the estimated coefficients by 100 to condense the tables and
provide an intuitive interpretation of the estimates in terms of percentage points. Consistent
with the previous literature, standard errors are clustered at the state level and observations
are weighted by BRFSS sample weights. The results are not sensitive to the use of weights.
6.1 Main Results
Table 2 reports the main results. The first column estimates Equation 12, which ignores
border crossing. I estimate that each $1 increase in the cigarette tax per pack decreases a
person’s probability of smoking by about 0.74 percentage points. Based on a recent CDC
report that 13.7% of Americans smoke every day (Jamal et al., 2014), this translates to a 5.4%
decrease in smoking participation per dollar. Based on a November 2014 average after-tax
retail price of $5.84 for a pack of cigarettes (Orzechowski and Walker, 2014) and a pass-
through rate of 1.11 (Keeler et al., 1996), this translates to a price-participation elasticity
of -0.28, reasonably consistent with surveys of the literature (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000;
Gallet and List, 2003).
Columns 2 and 3 respectively show that adding a quadratic term or controlling linearly for
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the costs of border crossing does not reveal any new conclusive results. Column 2 shows that,
without accounting for border crossing, the effect of a home tax increase on the probability of
smoking does not appear to vary much with the level of the tax. The quadratic term is small,
negative, and statistically insignificant. Column 3 introduces the nearest lower tax and the
log of the distance to that tax on the right hand side. The coefficient on the home tax is
very similar to that in column 1. While they are not statistically significant at conventional
levels, the estimated effects of the nearest lower tax and the log of distance are negative as
predicted by Equations 3 and 8.
Column 4 reports estimates of Equation 13, my preferred specification. In contrast to
columns 2 and 3, including a full set of interaction terms reveals significant implications of
border crossing. As predicted by Equation 4, βˆ3 is negative and significant at the 1% level,
indicating that a tax increase is more effective the higher the tax in the lower-tax state.
The point estimate implies that each dollar of the nearest lower tax causes a $1 increase in
the home state tax to decrease the probability of smoking by an additional 0.58 percentage
points. βˆ6 is positive and significant, indicating, in contrast to the result in column 2, that
each successive increase in the home state tax causes a smaller drop in smoking than the last.
βˆ7 is also positive and significant, indicating that each successive increase in the nearest lower
tax also causes a smaller drop in smoking than the last. Thus I report two main findings:
1) cigarette tax increases in the home state and the nearest lower-tax state complement
each other as deterrents to smoking in the home state, and 2) the deterrence achieved by an
increase in only one tax or the other diminishes as the tax rises.
βˆ4 and βˆ5 are not statistically significant and βˆ8 is weakly significant. Therefore I do not
observe compelling evidence of second-order effects involving distance. For the remainder of
the paper, I focus on the implications and robustness of the second-order effects that do not
involve distance.
βˆ0, βˆ1, and βˆ2 in the preferred specification are the estimated marginal effects at the
means of the variables over all years of the sample. For example, βˆ0 implies that, at the
means of the variables, a $1 increase in the home tax decreases the smoking rate by 0.887
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percentage points, which implies a price-participation elasticity of -0.34. However, the means
of the tax variables generally increased over time as shown in Table 1, and so the estimated
marginal effects may have changed as well. In Table 3, I use the year-specific means from
Table 1, my preferred estimates from column 4 of Table 2, and Equations 14-16 to estimate
marginal effects of increases in the home tax, nearest lower tax, and log of distance for each
year of the sample. The values are all negative, as expected.
Home tax increases were remarkably stable in mean effectiveness over the period, only
falling slightly after the federal tax increase in 2009. At each year’s mean values, an increase
in the home tax has a strongly significant negative effect on the probability of smoking, and
the implied elasticities all fall between -0.315 and -0.345. These values are in accordance with
the general cigarette tax literature (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; Gallet and List, 2003),
but are larger than the statistically insignificant elasticities reported by Lovenheim (2008).
Many methodological differences could account for the differences in estimated elasticities
at the means. Lovenheim uses an earlier dataset, restricts the sample to residents of MSAs,
aggregates the data at the MSA level, uses a linear time trend rather than fixed effects, and
uses a partial set of second-order terms justified by his stronger theoretical assumptions.
However, the primary message of this paper is that cross-border purchasing opportunities
impair the effectiveness of home tax increases. From this broader perspective, my results
agree with those of Lovenheim. In any case, more interesting than the magnitudes of the
mean elasticities is their apparent stability over time.
All else equal, β6 > 0 implies that home tax increases would have diminished in effec-
tiveness as they rose from 1999 to 2012. However, this was counteracted by the fact that
cross-border taxes rose as well. From the first column of Table 3 it appears that these two
effects approximately canceled out. I am not aware of a theoretical reason why the mean
effectiveness of an increase in the home state tax should have necessarily been so stable as
state taxes rose over time. Whether such stability persists will depend on the geographic
pattern of future tax increases. Generally speaking, if the U.S. becomes more of a checker-
board of high and low taxes, home taxes will become less effective. If, on the other hand,
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taxes converge across states, home tax increases will become more effective. To quantify
this, recall Equation 14, assume distance does not change, difference both sides, and insert
the preferred estimates. The result is:
∆
(
∂P (S = 1)
∂Tct
)
= −0.577×∆T ′ct + 0.384×∆Tct (17)
Then the effectiveness of a home tax increase is unchanged if
∆T ′ct
∆Tct
= 0.384
0.577
= 0.666.
Therefore, the point estimates imply that successive home tax increases do not decrease in
effectiveness as long as each increase in the home tax is accompanied by an increase in the
nearest lower tax of two-thirds the size.
Like the home tax, point estimates of the marginal effects of the nearest lower tax and
the log of distance are quite stable at the means from year to year. However, they are not
as strongly significant. In particular, the nearest lower tax has a small and statistically
insignificant effect at the means in each year. This suggests that, for many counties, taxes
have become high enough that an increase in the nearest lower tax alone will not decrease the
smoking rate. For two reasons, this does not imply that cross-border taxes do not matter.
First, these are only mean effects. If the home tax is high enough above the mean and
nearest lower tax is low enough below the mean, the effect of an increase in the nearest lower
tax will be significant. Second, the main result of the paper still holds. Even if an increase
in the nearest lower tax does not by itself have a significant effect on the home state smoking
rate, it does have a significant effect when it accompanies an increase in the home tax.
6.2 Robustness Checks
Table 4 reports the results of various modifications to Equation 13, while Table 5 reports
the results of various sample restrictions. My preferred estimates from column 4 of Table 2
are copied into the first column of both tables for comparison.
Column 2 of Table 4 replaces the state fixed effects with county fixed effects. In using
state fixed effects, I assume that all unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the
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left- and right-hand side variables do not vary below the state level. Thus my preferred
specification is vulnerable to unobserved differences across areas within the same state. For
example, the northern part of a state may have different cultural, political, or personal health
attitudes than the southern part. In column 2, I account for such differences at the county
level, the finest identified level of geography in the BRFSS. The estimates are very similar
to the baseline, confirming that the results are not driven by unobserved time-invariant
differences across counties.
Column 3 includes state-specific linear trends in the probability of smoking. If linear
changes in state characteristics over time are correlated with both cigarette taxes and smok-
ing rates, then adding the trend term would affect the estimates. However, column 3 is very
similar to the baseline, supporting the validity of the fixed effects model.
Column 4 removes federal taxes from the home and nearest lower taxes. In a linear
specification, this would have no effect on the estimates because the federal tax is the same
for all states at a given point in time, and is thus absorbed by the month fixed effects.
However, because the results rely on the coefficients on the second-order terms, they may
be sensitive to the exclusion of federal taxes. Column 4 confirms that the estimates are very
similar whether or not federal taxes are excluded.
Column 5 adds three binary controls for state bans on indoor smoking. If such bans
decrease smoking rates (Evans et al., 1999) and state governments that are more likely to
enact them are also more likely to enact tax increases, the preferred estimates may confound
the effects of taxes with the effects of bans. To address this, I use data on the effective
dates of smoking ban legislation from the American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation.12 34
states and the District of Columbia enacted bans on smoking in restaurants, bars, and/or
non-hospitality workplaces over the sample period. I control separately for the legality of
smoking in each of these three types of venues. Column 5 shows that doing so has practically
no effect on the estimates.
Column 6 expands the definition of a smoker to include those who smoke some days as
12The data is available at http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/EffectivePopulationList.pdf. I do not control for the thousands of
local-level indoor smoking bans in the U.S.
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opposed to only those who smoke every day. Roughly 5% of respondents reported smoking
some days but not every day in each year of the sample.13 Including some-day smokers
checks that the results are not driven by people who transition from everyday smoking to
some-day smoking in response to tax increases. If this was the case, then β3, β6, and β7
would be smaller in absolute value in column 6 than in the baseline. I show that this is not
the case, as these estimates are all larger in absolute value in column 6. Therefore the results
appear to be driven by people who are deciding not to smoke at all, and who are thus fully
capturing the intended individual benefits of cigarette taxes.
Table 5 reports the results of various sample restrictions. Column 2 excludes the West
census region, which is characterized by large counties that may exacerbate the measurement
error in the county-based distance calculations. Column 3 excludes the four states that share
a border with Mexico: California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Cigarette smuggling
from Mexico, as shown by Connelly et al. (2009), is evidence that the nearest lower tax and
distance measures may overstate the costs of border crossing for those counties close to the
Mexican border.14 The estimates in columns 2 and 3 are muted compared to the baseline,
but are qualitatively similar and remain statistically significant. This indicates that the
results are not driven by large counties in the West or smuggling from Mexico.
Column 4 excludes Alabama, Missouri, and Virginia from the sample. These three states
are characterized by many different cigarette taxes at the county and city level that I do not
account for in this paper. Excluding them has practically no effect on the estimates.15
In column 5, I restrict the sample to those counties that are observed in every year from
1999 to 2012, which removes about 27% of the observations.16 County identification in the
BRFSS improved over the sample period, so that some counties are only observed in the
later years. By removing those counties that are absent in one or more years, I check that
13The annual share of some-day smokers was highest in 2001 at 5.9% and lowest in 2010 at 4.7%, with no clear pattern over
time.
14Connelly et al. (2009) find no association between state cigarette sales and sharing a border with Canada. This is sensible
as cigarette taxes in Canada are higher than those in the U.S.
15The number of observations only falls by about 115,000. This is partly because Virginia was the lowest-tax state for the
first 68 months of the sample and Missouri was the lowest-tax state for the last 30 months, so those states were already excluded
in those periods, respectively.
16Each county-year with a positive number of observations has at least 21 observations.
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the results are not affected by changes in the composition of the sample over time. Indeed,
the estimates in column 5 are very similar to the baseline.
In sum, my results are robust to many alternative methods. The estimated coefficients on
the square of the home tax, the square of the nearest lower tax, and their interaction, which
form my main results, all remain statistically significant at conventional levels throughout.
The estimates on the square of the nearest lower tax and the interaction term are especially
robust, being significant at 1% in most specifications. Thus I provide evidence that border
crossing can limit a state’s ability to use taxes to deter its residents from smoking.
7 Conclusion
The existence of both casual and organized cigarette smuggling in the United States suggests
that a consumer’s decision to smoke does not only depend on the tax in his own state. In
particular, it implies an interacting effect between state taxes, such that a tax increase
is more effective when smuggling is less attractive. Intuitively, the marginal home state
cigarette consumer, when faced with a home state tax increase, will either switch to buying
cigarettes from a lower-tax state or quit smoking. The higher the tax in the lower-tax state,
the smaller the surplus from buying there, and thus the more likely he is to quit instead.
Using BRFSS data from 1999 to 2012, I estimate that a $1 increase in a state’s cigarette
tax reduces a resident’s likelihood of smoking by an additional 0.58 percentage points for
every dollar of the nearest lower tax. This is a large impact: at the sample means, about a
$1.50 increase in the nearest lower tax doubles the effectiveness of an increase in the home
state tax. Such an increase in the nearest lower tax is not unheard of; the mean nearest
lower tax in the sample rose by $1.23 (in January 2015 dollars) from 1999 to 2012.
I also find that successive tax increases, whether in the home state or the nearest lower-
tax state, cause smaller and smaller drops in the home state smoking rate if the other tax
does not change. I estimate that, especially after the federal cigarette tax increase in 2009,
nearest lower taxes were high enough that an increase in the nearest lower tax alone would
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not decrease the mean survey respondent’s probability of smoking. Home state tax increases,
on the other hand, did not decrease in effectiveness over time at the yearly means. I estimate
that maintaining the effectiveness of home state tax increases requires the nearest lower tax
to rise at two-thirds the rate of the home tax.
My results suggest that one state’s decision to raise its tax may make it worthwhile for a
neighboring state to do the same. For example, state legislatures in Ohio and West Virginia
have each considered $1 cigarette tax increases in 2015. Based on my estimates, a $1 tax
increase in West Virginia would cause 0.58% of the adult population (or roughly 3.5% of
everyday smokers) in eastern Ohio to respond to a $1 Ohio tax increase by quitting smoking
instead of buying cigarettes from West Virginia. Ohio would lose no revenue from this
group’s decision to quit, since the group’s alternative to quitting would be to buy across
the border. In addition, some Ohio smokers who were already buying cigarettes in West
Virginia may switch to buying in Ohio if the West Virginia tax rises. Thus a tax increase
in West Virginia would be a gain for Ohio in terms of both revenue generation and smoking
deterrence. This example also highlights that a cigarette tax increase will have differential
effects across counties within the same state. For a given home state tax increase, those
counties near a state with very low taxes will not experience as great a drop in smoking as
those for which border crossing is not as attractive an option.
Thus interstate politics are entangled in the major public health hazard that is smoking.
While smoking rates have fallen over the past decades, industry influence, innovations such
as electronic cigarettes, and strong preferences of those who still smoke mean the issue will
not go away quietly. States that wish to further curb smoking through higher taxes are
to some extent at the mercy of the states that surround them. Greater disincentives to
smoking on the part of either the most smoking-friendly states or the federal government
may be required for smoking rates to continue to fall.
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Table 1: Means of Variables
Year Everyday Smoker Home Tax Nearest Lower Tax Log(Distance) N
1999 0.191 0.914 0.679 4.365 101,276
2000 0.187 1.059 0.819 4.350 117,786
2001 0.184 1.029 0.792 4.345 137,294
2002 0.185 1.218 0.893 4.337 165,580
2003 0.177 1.484 1.081 4.312 181,605
2004 0.163 1.513 1.076 4.335 219,549
2005 0.159 1.709 1.180 4.307 252,032
2006 0.154 1.699 1.168 4.267 238,523
2007 0.156 1.656 1.134 4.414 315,441
2008 0.141 1.786 1.241 4.334 300,636
2009 0.134 2.349 1.788 4.333 310,872
2010 0.130 2.683 1.988 4.354 326,121
2011 0.138 2.585 1.938 4.360 364,551
2012 0.132 2.580 1.913 4.342 335,548
Full Sample 0.152 1.922 1.400 4.341 3,366,814
Home and nearest lower taxes are the sum of federal, state, and county cigarette taxes in the
respondent’s county measured in January 2015 dollars. Distance is the number of miles to the
nearest county in a lower-tax state.
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Table 2: Estimated Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Smoking Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Home Tax -0.741*** -0.669*** -0.702*** -0.887***
(0.187) (0.240) (0.178) (0.247)
Lower Tax -0.202 -0.129
(0.142) (0.228)
Log(Distance) -0.084 -0.183*
(0.136) (0.096)
Home Tax × Lower Tax -0.577***
(0.188)
Home Tax × Log(Distance) -0.004
(0.089)
Lower Tax × Log(Distance) 0.187
(0.150)
(Home Tax)2 -0.020 0.192**
(0.034) (0.080)
(Lower Tax)2 0.589***
(0.137)
(Log(dist))2 -0.155*
(0.091)
N 3,366,814 3,366,814 3,366,814 3,366,814
The dependent variable in all regressions is an indicator equal to one only if
the respondent smokes every day. Tax and distance variables are centered at
their sample means and all reported coefficients are multiplied by 100 to aid the
presentation of the results. All regressions include state fixed effects, month-year
fixed effects, the state unemployment rate in the survey month, and individual-
level controls for marital status, employment status, education, sex, race, the
presence of one, two, or three or more children in the household, income category,
and age category. Taxes are in January 2015 dollars and distance is in miles.
All regressions are weighted by BRFSS sample weights and all standard errors
are clustered by state.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Marginal Effects at Year-Specific Means
Year Home Tax Lower Tax Log(Distance)
1999 -0.905*** -0.188 -0.219**
(0.309) (0.305) (0.104)
2000 -0.901*** -0.197 -0.211**
(0.307) (0.306) (0.104)
2001 -0.900*** -0.204 -0.210**
(0.308) (0.310) (0.104)
2002 -0.879*** -0.206 -0.211**
(0.289) (0.285) (0.101)
2003 -0.881*** -0.142 -0.208**
(0.270) (0.242) (0.101)
2004 -0.901*** -0.082 -0.208**
(0.268) (0.223) (0.105)
2005 -0.898*** -0.067 -0.202*
(0.260) (0.209) (0.108)
2006 -0.894*** -0.072 -0.200*
(0.257) (0.208) (0.108)
2007 -0.881*** -0.080 -0.178
(0.246) (0.198) (0.109)
2008 -0.886*** -0.052 -0.178
(0.241) (0.186) (0.115)
2009 -0.876*** -0.055 -0.170
(0.233) (0.178) (0.118)
2010 -0.839*** -0.093 -0.166
(0.212) (0.167) (0.124)
2011 -0.830*** -0.106 -0.173
(0.209) (0.168) (0.125)
2012 -0.838*** -0.096 -0.164
(0.212) (0.168) (0.123)
Each value is calculated using the year-specific
means from Table 1, the estimates in column 4
of Table 2, and Equations 14-16. Standard errors
are calculated using the delta method.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%.
***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Robustness Checks: Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline County State No Fed. Control for Some-day
FEs Trends Taxes Smoking Bans Smokers
Home Tax -0.887*** -0.671** -0.668*** -0.900*** -0.871*** -0.596**
(0.247) (0.322) (0.246) (0.274) (0.233) (0.254)
Lower Tax -0.129 -0.128 -0.282 -0.089 -0.165 -0.187
(0.228) (0.303) (0.218) (0.232) (0.234) (0.248)
Log(Distance) -0.183* -0.057 -0.256*** -0.186* -0.173* -0.098
(0.096) (0.073) (0.088) (0.101) (0.096) (0.090)
Home Tax × Lower Tax -0.577*** -0.501** -0.570*** -0.501*** -0.555*** -0.944***
(0.188) (0.223) (0.164) (0.154) (0.177) (0.222)
Home Tax × Log(Distance) -0.004 -0.044 0.015 0.019 0.007 0.117
(0.089) (0.086) (0.090) (0.088) (0.084) (0.115)
Lower Tax × Log(Distance) 0.187 0.165 0.075 0.156 0.171 -0.123
(0.150) (0.171) (0.183) (0.200) (0.144) (0.196)
(Home Tax)2 0.192** 0.200* 0.119* 0.176** 0.186** 0.238***
(0.080) (0.101) (0.069) (0.082) (0.075) (0.076)
(Lower Tax)2 0.589*** 0.417** 0.510*** 0.525*** 0.577*** 0.848***
(0.137) (0.170) (0.133) (0.166) (0.129) (0.212)
(Log(dist))2 -0.155* -0.005 -0.176* -0.154 -0.152 -0.077
(0.091) (0.062) (0.097) (0.093) (0.093) (0.091)
N 3,366,814 3,366,814 3,366,814 3,366,814 3,366,814 3,366,814
The dependent variable in all columns except column 6 is an indicator equal to one only if the respondent
smokes every day. In column 6, the dependent variable is also equal to one for those that smoke some days.
Tax and distance variables are centered at their sample means and all reported coefficients are multiplied by
100 to aid the presentation of the results. All regressions include state fixed effects (or county fixed effects
in column 2), month-year fixed effects, the state unemployment rate in the survey month, and individual-
level controls for marital status, employment status, education, sex, race, the presence of one, two, or three
or more children in the household, income category, and age category. Taxes are in January 2015 dollars
and distance is in miles. All regressions are weighted by BRFSS sample weights and all standard errors
are clustered by state.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
32
Table 5: Robustness Checks: Sample Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline No West No Mex. No AL, Yearly-Sampled
Region Border MO, or VA Counties Only
Home Tax -0.887*** -0.722*** -0.792*** -0.880*** -0.851***
(0.247) (0.243) (0.237) (0.254) (0.277)
Lower Tax -0.129 -0.119 -0.236 -0.151 -0.057
(0.228) (0.224) (0.235) (0.231) (0.306)
Log(Distance) -0.183* -0.119 -0.046 -0.228** -0.206*
(0.096) (0.084) (0.078) (0.099) (0.108)
Home Tax × Lower Tax -0.577*** -0.395** -0.487** -0.561*** -0.599***
(0.188) (0.161) (0.182) (0.189) (0.194)
Home Tax × Log(Distance) -0.004 0.050 0.029 0.025 0.009
(0.089) (0.088) (0.083) (0.088) (0.082)
Lower Tax × Log(Distance) 0.187 0.174 0.084 0.163 0.050
(0.150) (0.163) (0.145) (0.153) (0.163)
(Home Tax)2 0.192** 0.127* 0.138* 0.194** 0.190*
(0.080) (0.068) (0.078) (0.082) (0.097)
(Lower Tax)2 0.589*** 0.472*** 0.579*** 0.592*** 0.613***
(0.137) (0.161) (0.150) (0.139) (0.162)
(Log(dist))2 -0.155* -0.115 -0.097 -0.175* -0.196*
(0.091) (0.096) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098)
N 3,366,814 2,559,092 3,056,734 3,251,058 2,453,890
The dependent variable in all regressions is an indicator equal to one only if the respondent
smokes every day. Tax and distance variables are centered at their sample means and all reported
coefficients are multiplied by 100 to aid the presentation of the results. All regressions include
state fixed effects, month-year fixed effects, the state unemployment rate in the survey month,
and individual-level controls for marital status, employment status, education, sex, race, the
presence of one, two, or three or more children in the household, income category, and age
category. Taxes are in January 2015 dollars and distance is in miles. All regressions are weighted
by BRFSS sample weights and all standard errors are clustered by state.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Appendix
Table A1: Further Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 6
Baseline Age Same State Add Lowest No Exclude
<65 Lower Tax Tax State Unemp. Refusers
Home Tax -0.887*** -1.008*** -0.778*** -0.905*** -0.688** -0.926***
(0.247) (0.290) (0.271) (0.251) (0.284) (0.249)
Lower Tax -0.129 -0.079 -0.154 0.102 -0.223 -0.147
(0.228) (0.268) (0.242) (0.227) (0.229) (0.270)
Log(Distance) -0.183* -0.184* -0.094 -0.124 -0.157 -0.171*
(0.096) (0.104) (0.091) (0.108) (0.095) (0.097)
Home Tax × Lower Tax -0.577*** -0.670*** -0.617* -0.574*** -0.465** -0.595***
(0.188) (0.218) (0.347) (0.189) (0.204) (0.168)
Home Tax × Log(Distance) -0.004 0.010 0.066 -0.005 -0.001 -0.039
(0.089) (0.105) (0.086) (0.086) (0.090) (0.083)
Lower Tax × Log(Distance) 0.187 0.219 0.120 0.181 0.154 0.208
(0.150) (0.164) (0.166) (0.136) (0.149) (0.155)
(Home Tax)2 0.192** 0.228** 0.197 0.201** 0.131 0.184**
(0.080) (0.096) (0.124) (0.082) (0.087) (0.080)
(Lower Tax)2 0.589*** 0.700*** 0.632*** 0.499*** 0.547*** 0.594***
(0.137) (0.160) (0.223) (0.137) (0.167) (0.137)
(Log(dist))2 -0.155* -0.175* -0.075 -0.118 -0.152 -0.143
(0.091) (0.098) (0.062) (0.092) (0.093) (0.090)
N 3,366,814 2,757,785 3,366,814 3,434,559 3,366,814 2,923,448
The dependent variable in all regressions is an indicator equal to one only if the respondent smokes every
day. Tax and distance variables are centered at their sample means and all reported coefficients are
multiplied by 100 to aid the presentation of the results. All regressions include state fixed effects, month-
year fixed effects, the state unemployment rate in the survey month (except in column 5), and individual-
level controls for marital status, employment status, education, sex, race, the presence of one, two, or three
or more children in the household, income category, and age category. Taxes are in January 2015 dollars
and distance is in miles. All regressions are weighted by BRFSS sample weights and all standard errors
are clustered by state.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table A2: Expanded Estimates From Preferred Specification
Taxes and Distance
Home Tax -0.887*** (0.247)
Lower Tax -0.129 (0.228)
Log(Distance) -0.183* (0.096)
Home Tax × Lower Tax -0.577*** (0.188)
Home Tax × Log(Distance) -0.004 (0.089)
Lower Tax × Log(Distance) 0.187 (0.150)
(Home Tax)2 0.192** (0.080)
(Lower Tax)2 0.589*** (0.137)
(Log(dist))2 -0.155* (0.091)
Marital Status
Married Omitted
Divorced 9.157*** (0.323)
Widowed 4.976*** (0.279)
Separated 9.135*** (0.418)
Never Married 3.286*** (0.232)
In Unmarried Couple 8.107*** (0.948)
Refused 3.947*** (0.883)
Employment Status
Employed For Wages Omitted
Self-Employed 0.353* (0.189)
Out of Work ≥ 1 Year 6.547*** (0.352)
Out of Work < 1 Year 6.241*** (0.465)
Homemaker -1.088*** (0.240)
Student -7.443*** (0.664)
Retired 0.349** (0.154)
Unable to Work 6.055*** (0.400)
Refused -0.183 (1.012)
Completed Education
No School Omitted
Grade 1-8 1.641* (0.848)
Grade 9-11 11.905*** (1.151)
High School 3.463*** (0.929)
Some College -1.223 (1.046)
College Degree -9.345*** (1.205)
Refused 0.111 (1.495)
Sex
Male Omitted
Female -2.603*** (0.252)
r2 0.090
The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one only if the respondent smokes every day. Tax and
distance variables are centered at their sample means and all reported coefficients are multiplied by
100 to aid the presentation of the results. Coefficients on state and month-year fixed effects are not
reported. Taxes are in January 2015 dollars and distance is in miles. The regression is weighted by
BRFSS sample weights and standard errors are clustered by state.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
Race
White, non-Hispanic Omitted
Black, non-Hispanic -7.574*** (0.850)
Other, non-Hispanic -5.199*** (0.467)
Multiracial, non-Hispanic 0.964* (0.490)
Hispanic -13.174*** (0.498)
Refused -2.755*** (0.558)
Children in Household
No Children Omitted
One Child -0.416* (0.213)
Two Children -1.833*** (0.229)
≥ Two Children -1.937*** (0.357)
Refused -2.926*** (0.713)
Income
< $10,000 Omitted
$10,000-$15,000 0.171 (0.383)
$15,000-$20,000 0.887** (0.389)
$20,000-$25,000 0.354 (0.341)
$25,000-$35,000 -1.196*** (0.424)
$35,000-$50,000 -2.493*** (0.496)
$50,000-$75,000 -4.704*** (0.631)
≥ $75,000 -7.154*** (0.704)
Don’t Know/Not Sure -3.401*** (0.653)
Refused -6.922*** (0.496)
Age
18-24 Omitted
25-29 3.989*** (0.334)
30-34 3.518*** (0.255)
35-39 3.930*** (0.259)
40-44 4.305*** (0.258)
45-49 3.892*** (0.287)
50-54 2.182*** (0.263)
55-59 -0.312 (0.328)
60-64 -3.525*** (0.454)
65-69 -6.841*** (0.706)
70-74 -10.276*** (0.836)
Refused -3.065*** (0.304)
State Unemployment -0.430*** (0.068)
N 3,366,814
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